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New definitions are proposed for the security of Transient-Key Cryptography (a variant on 
Public-Key Cryptography) that account for the possibility of super-polynomial-time Monte 
Carlo cryptanalytical attacks. Weaker definitions no longer appear to be satisfactory in the 
light of Adlem n’s recent algorithm capable of breaking the DiRie-Hellman scheme in 
RTIME(O(2 c( J+ ” Osnr)) for keys of length n. The basic question we address is: How can one 
relate the amount of time a cryptanalyst is willing to spend decoding cryptograms to his 
likelihood of success? What more can one say than the obvious “The more time he uses, the 
less lucky he needs to be?” These questions and others are partially answered in a relativized 
model of computation in which there exists a transient-key cryptosystem such that even a 
cryptanalyst willing to spend as much as (almost) 0(2 d’og”) steps on length n cryptograms 
cannot hope to break but an exponentially small fraction of them, even if he is allowed to 
make use of a true random number generator. This is rather tight because the same cryp- 
tosystem falls immediately if the cryptanalyst is willing to spend O(2’“) steps for any constant 
c > 0. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For thousands of years, cryptography has been the art of providing secure 
communication over insecure channels. The reliability of a proposed cryptosystem 
was attested by the amount of effort unsuccessfully spent by qualified experts trying 
to break it. During this century, however, mathematicians have attempted to find 
objective criteria for the security of cryptosystems, thus transforming this ancient art 
into an exact science. 
Claude Shannon, a pioneer in this domain, developed information theory (261 as a 
result of his previous (originally classified) work on cryptography [27]. For given 
cryptosystems, he was able to calculate exactly the amount of ciphertext required for 
a cryptanalysis to be considered reliable. Shannon’s conclusions and recommen- 
dations served as guidelines for the design of the 1977 officially approved Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [ 201. 
In the past few years, computer scientists have attempted to base the security of 
cryptography on the decade-old theory of computational complexity instead of 
Shannon’s information theory. The basic difference is that Shannon’s theory lives on 
the hope that the cryptanalyst will not have enough irlformation to decode a cryp- 
togram while computational complexity only expects the cryptanalyst not to have 
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enough time to do so. This makes it meaningful to talk about the security of cryp- 
tosystems that would have been immediately dismissed by Shannon’s theory. 
One of the major shortcomings of classical cryptography is that any two parties 
wanting to communicate privately over an insecure channel must have previously 
exchanged some secret information over a secure channel. This may cause prohibitive 
delays before secure communication between any two parties can be achieved. It also 
raises the question of what is a secure channel. Another problem is that the number 
of keys grows quadratically with the number of parties. 
In 1976, Diftie and Hellman defined the notion of Public-Key Cryptography 
(PKC) by which the above problems can be overcome [lo]. Secure communication 
over insecure channels between totally unacquainted parties became at last 
conceivable. Some implementations of public-key cryptosystems (pkc) have been 
proposed so far [ 10, 15, 17, 22, 23, etc.] but their security has yet to be proven. The 
reader is refered to 13, 141 for additional background on PKC. 
Before we can hope to prove that any of these systems is indeed secure, however, it 
is important to have a precise, formal definition of what security ought to mean. As 
shown in [ 8,9], it turns out that no pkc can be secure under any asymptotic 
definition of security. For this reason, the notion of Transient-Key Cryptography 
(TKC) was introduced as a slight variant on PKC with a flavour of Public-Key 
Distribution System [ 16, IO]. The following definition was then proposed: “A 
transient-key cryptosystem (tkc) is computationally secure if the probability that any 
given (deterministic) polynomial-time procedure can break a cryptogram goes to zero 
as the length of the cleartext message transmitted goes to infinity.” 
As a result of a few recent discoveries, this definition no longer appears to be 
satisfactory. Indeed, both the Diffie-Hellman and the Merkle-Hellman schemes 
] 10, 171 have been broken in the sense that new algorithms were developed by 
Adleman, Schroeppel and Shamir that are capable of computing discrete logarithms 
[ 1 ] and of solving the knapsack problem [25] efficiently enough to decode either kind 
of cryptogram in a matter of days or weeks, provided the originally proposed key- 
length is used. These algorithms are nonetheless not polynomial-time; they are simply 
more efficient than the obvious exponential-time exhaustive search techniques. 
Even more remarkable is the fact that Adleman’s algorithm is Monte Carlo (in 
fact, Las Vegas 141): It relies on the presumed availability of a truly random 
sequence of coin tosses. 
Finally, the above quoted definition of computational security says nothing about 
how fast the probability of cryptanalytical success should go to zero as a function of 
the length of the cleartext message. Obviously, the most we could ask of a cryp- 
tosystem would be that exhaustive search be the best possible cryptanalytical 
strategy. This would imply, in particular, that complete knowledge of how the cryp- 
tosystem works cannot help the cryptanalyst any more than would a mere 
enciphering/deciphering black box. Assuming there are exponentially many cleartext 
messages of any given length, notice that the probability of cryptanalytical success of 
exhaustive search remains exponentially small as long as the cryptanalyst uses a sub 
exponential amount of time. 
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These considerations lead us to a new level-oriented definition of security that can 
be intuitively understood as follows. A cryptosystem is immune to an algorithm if the 
latter’s likelihood of decoding a cryptogram goes to zero exponentially fast in’ the 
length of the cleartext message transmitted. Given a function t, the cryptosystem 
achieves level t of security if it is immune to any t(n)-time-bounded Las Vegas 
algorithm. 
Yet, an alternative approach is to allow the cryptanalyst to select his own criterion 
of success. He can choose a probability function p(n) and claim that any algorithm 
capable of decoding cryptograms of length n with probability at least p(n) breaks the 
system to his satisfaction. This leads to a tradeoff between the alleged luck of a cryp- 
tanalyst and the amount of time he must expect to spend in order to decode cryp- 
tograms. 
To substantiate these definitions, we prove the existence of a relativized model of 
computation in which there is a transient-key cryptosystem that nearly achieves level 
2”/‘Og” of security. Procedures such as Adleman’s algorithm for computing discrete 
logarithms, for instance, would quit much too soon to have any hope of decoding but 
an insignificant proportion of the cryptograms. The result is rather tight in the sense 
that the same cryptosystem does not achieve level 2’” of security for any constant 
c > 0. 
Under the tradeoff considerations, given any constant c > 1, any.procedure must 
run for at least [ 2”p(n)] V(c log ‘og12”p(n)1) steps almost everywhere in order to decode 
length 2n cryptograms with probability p(2n) for all n. 
2. TRANSIENT-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
As shown in [9], Public-Key Cryptography [lo] cannot be asymptotically secure 
because arbitrarily long messages can be enciphered using a fixed finite key. Since 
any key can be broken after a finite amount of work, it can always be broken in sub- 
linear time when the message to cryptanalyze is long enough. To solve this problem, 
the notion of Transient-Key Cryptography was introduced in order to always keep 
keys and messages roughly the same length. Moreover, the lifetime of any given key 
is restricted to one single communication, thus providing an advantage of the one- 
time-pad: any amount of corresponding cleartext/ciphertext is completely useless 
when faced with a new cryptogram to decode [ 131. For the sake of completeness, we 
repeat here the definition of Transient-Key Cryptography. 
As in Public-Key Cryptography, Transient-Key Cryptography is based on the 
belief that it is feasible to generate pairs of corresponding enciphering/deciphering 
algorithms from some trap-door information with the property that disclosure of the 
enciphering algorithm does not compromise the corresponding deciphering algorithm. 
Intuitively, a transient-key cryptosystem is used as follows. If Alfred wants to send 
a message to Barbara, he first gives her the message by-r, which is precisely 
the information she needs to randomly choose an appropritie key of similar length. 
She then uses it to select a corresponding pair of enciphering/deciphering algorithms 
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and sends back the enciphering algorithm. He uses it to encipher his message and 
sends her the ciphertext, which she deciphers using her secret deciphering algorithm. 
More formally, a transient-key cryptosystem consists of an infinite message space 
M, an infinite key space K, an infinite key-generator space X, a key-generator 
function g: M-t X, a key selection algorithm, and for each k E K, 
M, c M: the space of messages that can be enciphered using key k, 
E,:M,+M: a one-to-one enciphering algorithm, 
D, : Image[E,] + M, : the corresponding deciphering algorithm. 
Given any k E K and any x E M,, it must be that Dk(Ek(x)) =x. There must be a 
polynomial-time algorithm capable of generating both E, and D, from k. There must 
also be a polynomial that bounds the running times of algorithms E, and D, for 
every k E K. We assume that E, and D, can detect improper inputs within the same 
polynomial time bound. In practice, E, and D, are usually only data to a general 
enciphering/deciphering algorithm. For the sake of consistency with the above 
definition of transient-key cryptosystems, however, we would then consider such E,‘s 
and D,‘s as “algorithms” in a very restricted “programming language.” Notice that 
the meaning of such algorithms would depend on the specific tkc under consideration. 
Both M and K are sets of strings over (possibly different) alphabets. The message 
space M is usually the set of all strings over its underlying alphabet, but this is not 
necessarily so. For instance, it could be that M is the set of all syntactically correct 
English texts. It is more customary for the key space K to exclude some strings. For 
instance, it could be the set of binary string encodings of pairs of similar length 
primes (as in [23]). 
Given the key-generator g(x) of any message x E M, it must be easy to find many 
different keys k E K such that x E M,. This is accomplished trough the key-selection 
algorithm. Given input if? X, it uses a true random process to produce output k E K 
with some probability pr,(k) in such a way that, given any x E M and k E K, pr,,,,(k) 
is zero unless x E M,. The key-generator function g must be computable in 
polynomial time. However, because the length of g(x) could be (and usually will be) 
much smaller than that of x, it is not required that the key-selection algorithm run in 
time polynomial in the length of its input; rather, on any input i E X, it should run in 
time polynomial in the length of the shortest x E M such that g(x) = i. 
A tkc is used as follows: if A wants to send message x to B, 
A sends g(x) to B; 
B uses g(x) to generate a random k E K such that x E M,, 
computes E, and D, from k, 
sends E, to A; 
A computes c = Ek(x), 
sends c to B; 
B computes Dk(c), which is x. 
The key k, having fulfilled its purpose, can now be discarded. 
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Given a tkc, the cryptanalytic task consists of computing x from the triple (g(x), 
E,, Ek(x)), where x E M and pr,&) > 0. We define the length of such a triple as 
that of x itself. We call these triples cryptograms as opposed to Ek(x) which we call 
ciphertext. At this point, the reader should be reminded that a cryptanalyst, given a 
cryptogram, may use side information from his knowledge of the tkc, such as the 
exact nature of the message space and the key-selection algorithm. It could also 
happen that a cryptanalyst unable to carry out the cryptanalytic task as defined 
would be quite happy to get some information about the cleartext message. Such 
considerations will be briefly discussed in Section 9. 
It is important to understand that g(x) must give enough information for B to 
select a key that can be used by A to encipher his message x, yet not enough to 
substantially help the cryptanalyst compute x. An often adequate such function is 
simply g(x) = 1x1, the length of x. 
3. MONTE CARLO OR LAS VEGAS? 
We do not wish to restrict cryptanalysts to strictly deterministic procedures in 
order to carry out the cryptanalytic task. Not only would it be unrealistic, but it 
would be outright unfair. After all, cryptographers often use random information in 
the process of encryption. It has become customary to label coin-tossing algorithms 
as Monte Carlo (MC). The most famous MC algorithm is perhaps the 
Rabin-Solovay-Strassen test for primality [21,28] : There is a polynomial-time 
procedure using a true random number generator that is capable of determining with 
an arbitrarily low probability of error whether a given number is prime or composite. 
A peculiarity of this procedure is that it never gives a definite answer on numbers 
that happen to be prime. Hence you must believe the laws of probability to use it. 
Not every Monte Carlo algorithm suffers from this flaw. Lazlo Babai gives 
techniques for efficiently solving certain kinds of graph isomorphism problems [4]. 
Although his algorithms do use sequences of random coin tosses, they never yield a 
wrong answer. The worst that can happen is that they do not find an answer at 
all-in which case they honestly report failure. This is not dramatic since one simply 
has to rerun the same procedure on the same instance until an answer is got-and 
that answer has to be correct. This entire process will not take a prohibitive amount 
of time on the average provided the probability of failure is small enough each time 
through, and provided it is independent of the problem instance presented to the 
algorithm. 
In order to distinguish these never lying algorithms from ordinary Monte Carlo 
algorithms, Babai proposes they be refered to as “Las Vegas” (LV) [4]. Adleman and 
Manders gave early polynomial-time Las Vegas algorithms, which were in the realm 
of number theory [2]. 
It is obvious that any LV algorithm can be transformed into an equivalent MC 
algorithm that is at least as good: Simply return a random answer whenever the LV 
algorithm would have reported failure. It has been conjectured however that there are 
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tasks that can be carried out by efficient MC algorithms although no efficient LV 
algorithms could handle them [2]. This would mean that there are problems that can 
be solved efficiently only at the cost of an arbitrarily small probability of error. This 
might very well be the case for primality testing (but see Miller [ 191). Not every 
researcher shares this point of view, however. For another conjecture, see Bennett and 
Gill 161. 
This important distinction between Monte Carlo and Las Vegas vanishes when it 
comes to the cryptanalytic task of transient-key cryptosystems: any MC algorithm 
yields an equivalent LV algorithm. This is because a LV cryptanalyst can always 
verify the answer x provided by a MC algorithm on cryptogram (i, E, c) by 
computing E(x) and comparing it with c. 
We shall need later on some notation for the behaviour of LV procedures. Let T be 
any LV procedure. Let p be any finite sequence of bits. Tp denotes the deterministic 
procedure that behaves exactly as T except that whenever T would have called the 
random bit generator for the kth time, Tp uses the kth bit of p as “random” bit 
(unless Ipl < k, in which case Tp aborts). 
4. A LEVEL-ORIENTED DEFINITION FOR THE SECURITY OF TKC 
Consider any transient-key cryptosystem Q. 
Given any LV algorithm T and any cryptogram (i, E, c), let suc$((i, E, c)) be the 
probability that T, given (i, E, c) as input, finds the unique x in the domain of E such 
that E(x) = c. Notice that sucf((i, E, c)) would always be either zero or one, should 
T be deterministic. 
Given any x E M, the probability suc$(x) that T, given a randomly generated 
cryptogram (g(x), E, E(x)), finds the cleartext message x is given by 
suc%x> = SK br,,,,W x sue”,<< g(x). E,, Mx)H I. 
Given any integer n, assuming every cleartext message of length n has equal 
probability of being sent, the probability sucy(,) that T will successfully decode a 
cryptogram of length n is 
sLlc~(n) = 2: b44Il#w4 
xeM(n) 
where M(n) is the set of cleartext messages of length n. 
We say that the cryptosystem is immune to T if the probability that T breaks a 
randomly generated cryptogram goes to zero exponentially fast in the length of the 
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cleartext message transmitted. More precisely, the cryptosystem is immune to T if 
there exists a real-valued positive function E so that 
and 
lim e(n) = 0 n+x 
1 
sucgz) < - I 1 
1 --E(n) 
#M(n) 
for every integer n. Conversely, we say that T breaks any cryptosystem that is not 
immune to it. As explained in the Introduction, the intuitive idea behind this 
definition is to be as restrictive as possible with the cryptanalyst’s probability of 
success, yet keeping in mind that sub-exponential-time exhaustive search techniques 
should not be capable of breaking cryptosystems. This intuition is substantiated in 
the next section. 
As an alternative definition, the expected number of length 12 cryptograms 
successfully decoded by T when faced with one randomly generated cryptogram for 
each of the #M(n) length n cleartext messages is given by 
exp%) = C [ suc$(x)], which is #M(n) x suck. 
XEMOI) 
The cryptosystem is immune to T if this number is bounded above by any fixed root 
of the number of cryptograms there were to decode for almost every n. More 
precisely, the cryptosystem is immune to T if there exists a real-valued function E 
such that 
lim s(n) = 0 n-cc 
and 
e&(n) < [#M(n)]“(“) 
for every integer n. 
Finally, given any function t, we say that a cryptosystem achieves level t of 
security if it is immune to any Las Vegas algorithm that can be programmed on a 
multi-tape Turing machine (TM) [ 121 that never runs for more than t(n) steps on any 
length n cryptogram, no matter which random choices are made. 
5. WHAT CAN WE HOPE TO PROVE? 
A cryptosystem that achieved but a fixed polynomial level of security would hardly 
be interesting. The least we can ask for is perhaps a cryptosystem that simultaneously 
achieves every polynomial level of security. Unfortunately, it is obvious that such a 
cryptosystem cannot possibly exist unless P # NP [ 1 l] (because of the nature of 
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transient-key cryptography, a non-deterministic cryptanalyst could always guess what 
the cleartext message is, encipher it and compare the result with the ciphertext). 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is shown in the following Theorems that there 
cannot exist (under reasonable assumptions) a tkc that achieves any exponential level 
of security. It would be interesting if one could get a less trivial upper bound on the 
highest attainable level of security (if one exists, which is far from certain). Notice 
that such a result would be conceivable without settling the P = NP question. 
THEOREM 5.1. No transient-key cryptosystem whose space of cleartext messages 
is the set of all binary strings and whose key-generator function is the length function 
can achieve level 2’” of security for any constant c > 0. 
Proof Consider any tkc Q as in the premises of the Theorem. Let p be a 
polynomial that bounds the running time of every enciphering procedure of the cryp- 
tosystem. Consider any constant c > 0. 
Let T be the (deterministic) TM that, on cryptogram (n, E, c), runs through as 
many length n cleartext messages x as possible until either one is found such that 
E(x) = c (in which case T outputs x and stops) or 2’” steps have been used up (in 
which case T reports failure). T will spend about p(n) steps on each cleartext 
message, hence it can check about 2’“/p(n) of them before quitting. But p(n) < 2cn/2 
for every sufficiently large n. The expected number of length n cleartext messages that 
T can retrieve (no matter which of its cryptograms is actually sent) is at least 2’“‘* 
for those n. Hence, 
expQ,(n) > [ 2”]“* 
for every sufficiently large n. Hence, the cryptosystem is not immune to T. But T 
runs within 2’” steps. The conclusion follows. I 
The restriction that the key-generator of a cleartext message be its length in the 
previous Theorem can be relaxed somewhat. It would be enough if the cryptanalyst, 
given a cryptogram, could easily find linear bounds on its length. For one thing, how 
could he shut himself out after no more than 2’” steps if he did not even have an idea 
of the value of n itself? (Recall that the length of a cryptogram is defined as that of 
the cleartext message transmitted, hence it might be just as hard to find the exact 
length of a cryptogram than it is to decode it!) 
THEOREM 5.2. No transient-key cryptosystem whose space of cleartext messages 
is the set of all binary strings can achieve level 2’” of security for any constant c > 0, 
provided that there be a constant a > 1 such that it is easy from any length n cryp- 
togram to compute an integer m such that m < n < am. 
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as above. The only differences are that 
we must choose the polynomial p so that it is monotonic increasing, and we consider 
a machine T that runs for no more than 2’” steps (hence no more than 2’” steps) and 
tries cleartext messages of every length up to am in a cyclic manner. This new T will 
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have time to go through at least 2’“/amp(am) cleartext messages of length n before 
quitting. Hence 
exp$) > 2C”a/unp(un) > [2n]c/2a 
for every sufficiently large n. I 
6. OBLIVIOUS LUCK 
The proofs in the previous section involved algorithms that make very little use of 
the cryptograms they have to decode. We say that an algorithm is oblivious if its flow 
of control depends only on the length of its input until either it quits or it finds the 
secret key or the cleartext message, at which point the flow of control is allowed to 
depend on the specific input. 
An oblivious algorithm has two main strategies to decode a given cryptogram 
(i, E, c). It can try cleartext messages x until one is found such that E(x) = c, or it 
can try keys k with pr,(k) > 0 until one is found such that E, E E. In the latter case, 
D, can be computed easily from k and the cleartext message is simply Dk(c). 
Yet another dichotomy is that an algorithm can either try messages or keys using 
some deterministic rules (such as a list of the most probable cleartext messages or 
keys), or it can generate them randomly. We refer to these strategies as passive luck 
and active luck, respectively. 
Combining the above considerations, we get a classification of oblivious strategies 
into four categories. The algorithm in Section 5 relied on their passive luck on 
cleartext messages. This is the easiest case to study, but it is also the least interesting 
because whether or not a cryptogram will be decoded depends only on the cleartext 
message transmitted. Very similar results follow from the study of the active luck 
strategy on cleartext messages, only the 2C”-time-bounded TM would break length n 
cryptograms with probability at least 
1 - [ 1 - l/(2” un)]~‘“‘%‘~“’ 
for some polynomial p and constant a > 1. This is not quite as good as the 
2c”a/(2” anp(un)) 
result of Theorem 5.2 but it is better in the sense that the active luck strategy breaks 
any cryptogram with the same probability rather than breaking a few with probability 
one at the cost of failing entirely on the others. 
It is even more interesting to study the key finding strategies. It is possible to use a 
passive luck strategy that truly relies on the cryptographer’s badluck and is 
independent from the cleartext message, although strictly dependent on the cryp- 
togram. A more precise study of this approach is not possible without more infor- 
mation on the key-selection algorithm. 
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Finally, the active luck key finding strategy consists of running the cryptographer’s 
own key-selection algorithm on the key-generator i to produce keys k E K with 
probability pr,(k) > 0. The probability of success for a 2’“-time-bounded algorithm 
can be seen to be bounded above by 
1 - [l - c [pr~(k)]]2C”““4(n) 
&SK 
for some polynomial q and constant a > 1. Here again, a more precise study is not 
possible without knowledge of the key-selection probability distribution. 
7. A HIGHLY SECURE (BUT RELATIVIZED)CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In view of the wide gap between Theorem 5.2 and the best achievable level of 
security we could prove for any transient-key cryptosystem without settling the 
P = NP question, we have decided to consider the problem of cryptography in 
relativized models of computation. 
An oracle machine (OM) is an ordinary Turing machine that can invoke an orucle 
to perform in a single step a task that could otherwise be very difficult or even 
impossible. We use T’ to denote the OM T running under oracle d. The d-relativized 
model of computation is the set of every oracle machine running under oracle d. 
In other words, it is a standard model of computation except that any question 
asked of the oracle counts as only one step. 
Relativized models of computation are interesting because they differ so little from 
standard models. Most notions of standard computational complexity theory 
generalize to relativized models in an obvious way. For instance, one can talk about 
relativized P and NP. More importantly, most theorems about standard models 
remain true when relativized. A proof that some theorem holds in a specific 
relativized model does not imply that it also holds in a standard model. It nonetheless 
gives evidence that an eventual proof that the theorem does not hold in a standard 
model would have to be somehow unusual. This is why Baker, Gill and Solovay’s 
result to the effect that P = NP in some relativized models while P # NP in some 
others [S] is so interesting: it gives one reason why the problem is still unsolved in 
standard models. 
It was shown in [8,9] that there exists a recursive relativized model of 
computation in which no tkc can achieve every polynomial level of security while 
there is another recursive model in which there is a tkc that does achieve 
simultaneously every (deterministic) polynomial level of security. The main result 
presented here is that there also exists a recursive model in which there is a tkc that 
nearly achieves level 2”‘log” of security, even considering Las Vegas attacks. 
The basic notion needed to prove this result is that of cryptoracle, which was 
introduced in (81. For the sake of self-containment, here is a (simplified) definition of 
this concept. 
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A cryptoracle f consists of a key-encoding length-preserving permutation Kf: 
.Z* + X*, and for each r E Z*, an enciphering permutation E{: Z”’ + Z”‘. (Z denotes 
lo9 11.) 
An oracle machine T running under cryptoraclef can ask the following questions. 
(i) Here is some s E Z*, give me K’(s). (Intuitively, here is a secret key, give 
me a corresponding key that I may reveal without fear.) 
(ii) Here are x, r E C* so that Ix/= Irl. G ive me E{(X). (Intuitively, here are a 
cleartext message and a revealed key, give me the corresponding ciphertext.) 
(iii) Here are c, s E Z* so that ICI = Is I. Give me the unique x E Z* so that 
E{(x) = c where r = KY(s). (Intuitively, here are a ciphertext and a secret key, give me 
the cleartext message that would be enciphered into the ciphertext using the revealed 
key corresponding to the secret key.) 
Schematically, the questions one can ask of a cryptoracle correspond to the arrows 
in the illustration below (where x is the cleartext message, c is the ciphertext, and s 
and r are the corresponding secret and revealed keys). 
Given a cryptoracle f, there is a natural transient-key cryptosystem that can be 
defined, which we refer to as the standard t&c based onf, denoted C’, that works as 
follows. If A wants to send a message x to B, 
A sends n=lx( to B; 
B generates a secret key s chosen randomly with uniform probability 
among the binary strings of length n, 
asks of the cryptoracle for the corresponding key r = Kf(s), 
sends r to a; 
A asks of the cryptoracle for c = E:(x), 
sends c to B; 
B given s and c, asks of the cryptoracle for the unique x such that 
c = E{(x). 
The problem is in defining the cryptoracle so that cryptanalysts will not be able to 
efficiently compute a cleartext message from one of its cryptograms (recall that by 
cryptogram is meant the information actually transmitted between cryptographers, 
namely the length of the message, the revealed key and the ciphertext itself). It should 
be emphasized that the model of computation is fair in the sense that cryptanalysts 
are allowed exactly the same set of questions cryptographers are-and they get the 
same answers. The subtlety is that they will not be able of efficiently determine which 
are the relevant questions to ask. 
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Given a cryptoracle J a Las Vegas oracle machine T, a binary string p of coin 
tosses and integers n and t, let I(n) denote the set of length n cryptograms that can be 
generated using @: 
Z(n)= ((n,r,c) Irl=lcl=n). 
Let Sf,(n, p) denote the set of those length n cryptograms successfully decoded by Ti : 
Sf,(n, p) = ((n, r, c) E Z(n) 1 E;(Tf,((n, r, c))) = c). 
Let prodr(n, t) denote the probability that Tf successfully decodes a randomly 
generated length n cryptogram without using its random bit generator more than t 
times: 
prod,(n, t) = XI [#S$(n, p>/#Z(n)]/#P. 
i7EZ 
Finally, let prod,(n) denote the probability that T* successfully decodes a randomly 
generated length n cryptogram: 
probr(n) = fif prod,(n, t). + 
Notice that the limit is always well defined as prodr(n, t) is bounded above by 1 and 
is a non-decreasing function of t. Also notice that the above definition of prod,(n) 
corresponds exactly to suc$n). 
We wish to find a (recursive) cryptoracle f that keeps prod,(n) exponentially small 
as a function of n for Las Vegas oracle machines Tf that use as much time as 
possible. We have already seen that if Tf is allowed to run for an exponential amount 
of time, there is no hope to keep prod,(n) small enough. On the other hand, it is 
shown in 191 that there is a recursive cryptoracle capable of keeping prod,(n) small 
for every polynomial-time deterministic machine Tf as long as n is an exact power of 
two. In this section, we prove a new, much tighter result. 
For a technical reason, the standard tkc based on f will actually be used only for 
the transmission of messages of length an exact power of two. The problem of 
sending other messages will be taken care of later. 
Given a transient-key cryptosystem Q, we refer to the cryptograms that can be 
generated using Q as Q-cryptograms if there is any danger of confusion with another 
cryptosystem. Notice that the exact same triple (i, E, c) can represent different cryp- 
tograms under different cryptosystems. 
Given a tkc Q and a Las Vegas oracle machine T, t:(n) denotes the maximum 
number of steps Td can take on any length n Q-cryptogram, under any cryptoracle d, 
using any random sequence of coin tosses. It is necessary to specify the cryptosystem 
in the t: notation because the same input can represent different length cryptograms 
under different cryptosystems. Of course, it can happen that t:(n) be infinity. 
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A function v is vulnerable if there exists a real-valued function E and a time- 
constructible [ 121 monotonic increasing function u such that 
and 
lim E(n) = 0 
“Am 
u(n) Q u(n) Q 2ns(“)“o*n 
for every integer n. (Notice that the function u is also vulnerable.) 
Finally, a LV OM T is Q-vulnerable if the function t?(n) is vulnerable. 
THEOREM 7.1. There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that, for any LV OM T 
and any integer n, 
pro6(2n) < (2 X t:‘(2”) + 1) X 2(er+‘)X(no-“+‘) X (n, + l)! 
T \ 2=” X n! 9 
where 
n, = [ log tF’(2”) ] 
and e, denotes the number of T in some acceptable Giidel numbering of all L V OMs. 
Proof: The proof of this Theorem is rather lengthy and it requires an inordinate 
amount of notation. It can be found in the Appendix. The interested reader is refered 
to [9] for a more leisurely, easier proof of a special case of this Theorem where T is 
not allowed to use more than a polynomial amount of time nor to make random 
choices. 1 
LEMMA 7.2. For any integers n > 2, t > 2 and e > 0, 
(2t+ 1)x 2 (e+l)(“ogt’-n+l) x ([log t] + l)! < te+3+,og,ogr 
n! \ 
Proof. This is proven by routine algebraic manipulations. Perhaps the only step 
worth mentioning is the identity 
(lois t) log t = pg log t * 
LEMMA 7.3, There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that, for any LV OM T 
and any integer n, 
Proof: Immediate from the above lemma and theorem. 1 
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LEMMA 7.4. There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that, for any 
Cf-vulnerable L V OR4 T, there is a real-valued function 6 such that 
lim 6(n) = 0 
n-cO 
and, for any integer n, 
I - S(2”) 
. 
ProoJ Let f be as in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Consider any Ctvulnerable 
LV OM T. Define two real-valued functions E and 6 as follows: 
e(n) = log n log t$‘(n)/n 
and 
6(n) = [ 1 + (e, + 3 + log E(n) - log log n)/log n] X e(n). 
Since T is Cr-vulnerable, 
Therefore, 
lim E(n) = 0. 
“02 
lim 6(n) = 0 
“KC 
as well. The desired result follows from routine algebraic manipulations, the above 
equations and Lemma 7.3. 1 
We are now ready to take care of the transmission of messages of arbitrary 
lengths. 
Given any integer n, let in] denote the smallest exact power of two strictly larger 
than n. 
The padding function CT: .E* + Z* is defined as follows: given any x E C”, a(x) is 
the concatenation of in] - n - 1 zeroes, one one, and x itself. Clearly, lo(x)] = [lx]] 
(an exact power of two) for every x E C*, u is one-to-one, and given any y in the 
image of u, it is easy to find the unique x such that a(x) = y. 
Given a cryptoraclef, the padding ckc based onf, denoted D*, works as follows: if 
A wants to send x to B, he uses the standard tkc based on f to send u(x) to B, from 
which B computes the original x. Notice that the length of a Cf-cryptogram is easy to 
compute from it, but not that of a Dfcryptogram. However, given a length n 0’. 
cryptogram, it is easy to compute an m such that m < n < 2m (namely, half the 
length of the same triple considered as a Cf-cryptogram). 
The following Lemma gives the crucial relation between the standard and the 
padding transient-key cryptosystems based on the same cryptoracle. 
294 GILLES BRASSARD 
LEMMA 7.5. Given any cryptoracle f and any LV Oh4 T, let t(n) be any 
monotonic increasing, time-constructible function such that t(n) 2 max(n, c(n)) for 
every integer n. There exists a LV Oh4 U such that 
t;‘(n) = O(t(n)) 
and 
suc~n) < 2’“‘-n x sllc~<nn~) 
for every integer n. 
Proof. Let U’ on input (n, r, c) E T(n) simulate Tf on the same input for a 
maximum of t(n) steps and return a(x) whenever Tf would have returned an x such 
that 1x1 < n. It is clear that tg(n) = O(t(n)) since t(n) = D(n) and the computation of 
a(x) can be performed in linear time. 
Now, consider any length n Df-cryptogram. The same triple is a length [ni 
Cf-cryptogram. Moreover, since t(unl) > t(n) > c(n), T* breaks it with respect to D’ 
and iJf breaks it with respect to Cf with the same probability. Hence, 
The result follows immediately. 1 
LEMMA 7.6. There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that the padding tkc 
based on f is immune to Tf for any L&dnerable L V OM T. 
ProoJ Let f be as in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Consider any H-vulnerable 
LV OM T. Assume (for a contradiction) that Tf breaks 0’. Let U be as in 
Lemma 7.5. Notice that U is Cf-vulnerable. Define e(n) such that 
l-&(n) 
su&(n)= & . 
[ I 
By definition, since T* breaks d, it is not the case that 
lim e(n) = 0. 
n-m 
Therefore, there is a real number A > 0 such that E(n) > A for infinitely many values 
of n. Consider any such n. From Lemma 7.5, 
suc$([n]) > 2”-lnI x sucz(n) > ’ [ 1 
1-W) 
‘F 
(the last inequality is because [nj/n < 2). 
But suc$(in]) = prol$(UnJJ) and U is Cf-vulnerable. This contradicts 
Lemma 7.4. I 
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MAIN THEOREM 7.7. There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that the padding 
transient-key cryptosystem based on f achieves any vulnerable level of security in the 
frelativized model of computation. 
Proof. Let f be as in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Let v be any vulnerable function, 
Assume (for a contradiction) that L?’ does not achieve level u of security in the f- 
relativized model of computation. Let T be a LV OM such that Tf breaks of and 
suppose that Tf never uses more than v(n) steps on any length n cryptogram (in this 
proof, only 0’ is considered, so the length of a cryptogram is unambiguously 
defined). Let u be a time-constructible monotonic increasing vulnerable function such 
that v(n) < u(n) for every n. Finally, let V be the LV OM that behaves exactly as T 
except that, no matter which oracle is used, it never runs for more than u([n]) steps 
on any length n cryptogram. This is possible because u is time-constructible and 
because it is easy to compute In] from a length n cryptogram even though n itself 
could be hard to compute. 
Clearly, Vr provides the same results as Tf with the same probabilities on any 
given cryptogram. Hence, Vf breaks 0’: But v is P-vulnerable since it never takes 
more than u(2n) steps on any length n cryptogram. This contradicts the previous 
Lemma. I 
Notice that Theorem 7.7 is rather tight because Theorem 5.2 does apply to the 
padding tkc based onf: 
8. A TIME-LUCK TRADEOFF 
An objection one might have to the level-oriented definition of security presented 
so far in this paper is that it should be up to each individual cryptanalyst to define 
what he means by “my procedure breaks your cryptosystem to my satisfaction.” The 
question then becomes: How can we relate the alleged luck of a cryptanalyst to the 
amount of time he should expect to spend to break any given cryptogram? Until now, 
we have looked at the world from the cryptographers’ viewpoint. In this section, we 
will be on the cryptanalyst’s side; a cryptosystem will be “nice” if it is not too hard 
to break. 
Given any probability function p and any time function t, a transient-key cryp- 
tosystem Q succumbs to the t-p (time-luck) tradeoff if there is a Las Vegas algorithm 
T that can be programmed on a multi-tape Turing machine that never runs for more 
than t(n) steps on any length n cryptogram such that 
4(n) > p(n) 
for every integer n. 
The following theorem provides a trivial upper bound on how large t must be in 
relation top for any tkc to succumb to the t-p tradeoff. 
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THEOREM 8.1. Consider any transient-key cryptosystem whose space of cleartext 
messages is the set of all binary strings, such that there is a constant a 2 1 such that 
it is easy from any length n cryptogram to compute an integer m such that 
m<n<am. 
Consider any probability function p such that 2*p(n) is a monotonic increasing 
time-constructible function of n. 
The tkc succumbs to the t-p tradeoflfor any function t whenever 
0) 2 [ 2’“p(an) I’ 
for any constant c > 1. 
Proof The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 5.2. 1 
How tight is this Theorem? Once more, there is no hope of proving that any time- 
luck tradeoff is as tight as possible, even on particular tkc’s, without proving P # NP 
(unless the tradeoff is trivial, in which case the tkc is useless). Indeed, given any 
tkc Q, there would be a polynomial r such that Q would succumb to the r - 1 
tradeoff, should P = NP. 
Fortunately, the situation is more pleasant in some relativized models of com- 
putation. 
LEMMA 8.2. There exists a recursive cryptoracle f such that tf the padding tkc 
based on f succumbs to any t-p tradeoflin the f-relativized model of computation for 
any time-constructible monotonic increasing function t such that t(n) > n for every n, 
then 
p(n) < [t(2n)]c’og’og’(2n)/2n a.e. 
for any constant c > 1. 
Proof Let f be as in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Let t be any monotonic increasing 
time-constructible function such that t(n) > n for every integer n. Let c be any 
constant c > 1. Let p be any probability function. Assume of succumbs to the t-p 
tradeoff in the f-relativized model of computation. Let T be a LV OM such that Tf 
never runs for more than t(n) steps on any length n @-cryptogram and such that 
s&(n) 2 p(n) 
for every integer n (in other words, let T be a witness that 0’ succumbs to the 
tradeoff). 
Let U be as in Lemma 7.5. For every integer n, 
p(n) < 21nnen X suc$([nn). 
By Lemma 7.3, 
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But 
and 
Hence, 
p(n) < [ r(2n)]c’og’og’(2n’/2n 
for every sufficiently large n. I 
LEMMA 8.3. For any x, y and c such that x > 2, c > 0 and c log log y > 1, 
ifx< y ll(ClO~~OY3Y) then y > xclo~lok?x* 
Proof Obvious. 1 
We are now ready to reformulate the main Theorem in its tradeoff version. It gives 
a lower bound on the amount of time a cryptanalyst must spend in worst case if he 
wishes to break cryptograms with a given probability function. 
MAIN THEOREM 8.4. There exists a recursive cryptoracle such that if the padding 
transient-key cryptosystem based on f succumbs to a t-p time-luck tradeoff in the 
frelativized model of computation for any probability function p and any time 
constructible monotonic increasing function t such that t(n) >, n for every integer n, 
then 
Qn) > [2”p(n)]‘l”‘0”‘O”12”P’“‘l’ a.e. 
for any constant c > 1. 
Proof Immediate from Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3. i 
It is interesting to compare this result with the following corollary to Theorem 8.1. 
COROLLARY 8.5. Consider the recursive cryptoracle f of Theorem 8.4. Consider 
any probability function p such that 2*p(n) is a monotonic increasing time- 
constructible function of n. The padding transient-key cryptosystem based on f 
succumbs to the t-p time-luck tradeofl in the f-relativized model of computation for 
any function t whenever 
t(in> 2 12”p(n)l’ 
for an-v constant c > 1. 
Proof Immediate from Theorem 8.1. Simply notice that a = 2 in this context. i 
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9. LIMITATIONS OF THE DEFINITIONS 
The level-oriented definition of computational security for Transient-Key Cryp- 
tography and the notion of time-luck tradeoff presented in this paper are far from 
perfect. They could be considered either as too strong or too weak, depending on the 
context. Most importantly, one must always keep in mind the unavoidable limitations 
of asymptotic definitions: They cannot deal at all with the finite nature of applied 
cryptography. 
Rabin has proposed “public-key functions that are as intractable as factorization” 
in the precise sense that “for any given n, if we can invert the function y = E,(x) for 
even a small percentage of the values y then we can factor ,” [22 1. This has 
prompted Meyer to suggest that “it ought to be a theorem that if factoring is not in P 
(perhaps a slightly stronger hypothesis about frequency of hard instances is also 
needed) then Rabin’s public-key cryptosystem achieves every polynomial level of 
security” [ 181. Unfortunately, this is not so. The only immediate consequence of 
Rabin’s Theorem 2 is that should Rabin’s scheme succumb to the t-p time-luck 
tradeoff for any functions t and p, there would be a Las Vegas algorithm running in 
expected time O(t(n)/p(n)) capable of factoring a proportion Lf(p(n)) of those 
(presumably difficult) length n integers used as public key. In order to conclude from 
this that Rabin’s scheme achieves any nontrivial polynomial level of security at all, 
the necessary (ridiculous) assumption would be that factoring requires more than an 
exponential amount of time! This happens because we insisted that a cryptosystem 
does not achieve level t of security unless the probability of cryptanalytical success of 
any t(n)-time-bounded LV algorithm goes to zero exponentiafZy fast in the length of 
the cryptograms it has to decode. This indicates that the level-oriented definition of 
computational security proposed here is perhaps too strong in practive to hope ever 
to prove anything even under reasonable assumptions. 
On the other hand, the definition is too weak in the sense that it does not take into 
account unconventional attacks or information leakage. For instance, Rivest has 
noticed that “Rabin’s scheme-without a hashing or one-way compression 
function-is amenable to having the problem of factoring the modulus reduced to 
being able to extract modular square roots (deciphering in this case). The 
constructive nature of this proof is in fact a serious weakness inasmuch as if one can 
mount a chosen-ciphertext attack one can use the recipient’s own deciphering box to 
extract the square roots needed to factor the modulus.” [24]. Lipton has also 
observed that Rivest, Shamir and Adleman’s RSA scheme “leaks” partial information 
about messages. Indeed, a ciphertext is a perfect square with respect to the modulus if 
and only if the plaintext message is. 
It would be conceivable for a tkc achieving high levels of security to be completely 
insecure in practice. Although chosen-ciphertext attacks cannot be mounted against 
transient-key cryptosystems (precisely because of the transient nature of the key), 
there might be other types of attacks, the success of which would not be prevented by 
the definition of security. For instance, it could be easy for a cryptanalyst to recover 
a cleartext message given its encipherement under two distinct keys, thus forcing 
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cryptographers to paraphrase any message meant to be sent to several different 
people. 
More importantly, even if it were infeasible for the cryptanalyst to determine 
exactly the cleartext message from the cryptogram, it could be that some information 
can be computed about it. For instance, it could be that the first v’& bits of any 
length n cleartext message are always easy to determine from the corresponding cryp- 
tograms. This is a very serious weakness of the definition of computational security 
proposed here because the security of a communication is a function of the lengrh of 
the cleartext message transmitted rather than of the effort the cryptographers are 
willing to spend. It could be that short messages cannot be sent securely even if they 
were randomly embedded in longer messages. Such padding techniques could be used 
successfully, however, if the cryptosystem were strongly secure as outlined below. 
Given a tkc, an integer m and a cryptogram, the m-cryptanalytic task consists of 
computing the first m bits of the corresponding cleartext message. Given a function t, 
a tkc strongly achieves level t of security if, for any m and any t(n)-time-bounded Las 
Vegas algorithm, the probability that the algorithm successfully carries out the 
m-cryptanalytic task on a cryptogram goes to zero exponentially fast in the length of 
the cryptogram. Notice that the distinction between Monte Carlo and Las Vegas 
attacks no longer vanishes if one is concerned with m-cryptanalytic tasks. There 
would be no obvious ways of checking the answer provided by a Monte Carlo 
algorithm. 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
We have proposed new definitions of computational security for transient-key 
cryptography. The level-oriented definition says how much time a cryptanalyst must 
spend in order to break any significant proportion of the cryptograms. According to 
this definition, it is actually possible to rank cryptosystem: tkc C is more secure than 
tkc D if the former achieves any level of security achievable by the latter, but not 
conversely. The alternative time-luck tradeoff definition goes further: It allows the 
cryptanalyst to specify exactly what he means by “any significant proportion of the 
cryptograms.” The problem is then to relate the amount of time a cryptanalyst is 
willing to spend to the likelihood of breaking cryptograms he wishes to achieve. 
Unfortunately, these definitions do not seem to have any immediate practical uses 
for if any nontrivial level of security or time-luck tradeoff could be proven for an 
actual cryptosystem, we could conclude that P # NP. However, it is sometimes 
possible to prove nontrivial negative results in some particular cases by exhibiting a 
subexponential algorithm to break a given cryptosystem (see Adleman [ 11, for 
example). Could such nontrivial results be proven in a more general setting? 
The situation is more pleasant in some relativized models of computation. There is 
a relativized cryptosystem that nearly achieves level 2n/‘og” of security, yet it does not 
achieve level 2’” for any constant c > 0. The same cryptosystem succumbs to any t-p 
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tradeoff whenever 2”p(n) is a time-constructible monotonic increasing function of n 
and 
for any constant c > 1, yet it does not succumb to any t-p tradeoff whenever t is 
time-constructible monotonic increasing, t(n) 2 n for every n and 
@) > [ yp@)] m~wb!l2”P~~)1) 
for any constant c > 1. 
It would be interesting if one could tighten even more the gap between achievable 
and non-achievable levels of security in some other relativized cryptosystem. Does 
there exist a recursive relativized cryptosystem that achieves level 2”&@) of security 
for any real-valued function E so that lim,,, e(n) = O? Also, could one find a 
relativized cryptosystem and prove a simple relation between probability and time 
functions such that the cryptosystem succumbs to the t-p tradeoff precisely when the 
relation holds between t and p? What about strongly secure relativized 
cryptosystems? 
On a more practical level, any new result about non-relativized cryptosystems 
would be of great importance. Could one improve on Theorems 5.2 and 8.1? Such 
improvements would be possible without settling the P = NP question. Could a 
nontrivial positive result be obtained on a “real” cryptosystem, perhaps under the 
assumption that P # NP or even NP # Co NP? This last question appears to baffle 
contemporary complexity theory; it was shown in [7] that the theory of NP- 
completeness is unlikely to be the direction to follow. 
Section 9 lists several imperfections of the proposed definitions. What could be 
done about them? The stronger definition of security outlined at the end of Section 9 
is not very satisfactory: Even a strongly secure cryptosystem could leak information 
such as the last bit of the cleartext messages or some kind of checksum. How could 
the definition of computational security be tightened to insure that the enemy cannot 
find out anything about the cleartext message? Finally, and most importantly, how 
could the security of cryptography be defined in a non-asymptotic setting? 
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1 
In this appendix, we deal exclusively with standard tkcs based on various cryp- 
toracles. For this reason, it makes sense to talk about the length of a cryptogram 
without having to specify the cryptosystem under consideration. For simplicity, we 
often confuse a cryptoracle with the standard tkc based on it. 
We wish to build a recursive cryptoracle f that can keep pro6,(2”) asymptotically 
as small as possible relative to the speed of any LV OM T. Given any integer n, any 
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LV OM T and any cryptoracle h, Lemma A.2 implies the existence of a cryptoracle g, 
differing from h only when it comes to enciphering and deciphering length n 
cryptograms, such that probB,(n) is very small indeed. One might be tempted to iterate 
this result in order to infer that, given any LV OM T, there exists a cryptoraclef such 
that prob$$(n) is small for every integer n (not even only exact powers of two). This 
simple idea does not quite work: even if h were chosen (using Lemma A.2) such that 
probh,(n - 1) is small, there would be no guarantee that probt(n - 1) is kept small. It 
could happen that the new information contained. in g somehow gives away every 
length n - 1 cryptograms! Fortunately, not only is there one cryptoracle g capable of 
keeping probt.(n) small; there are lots of them. The key observation is that amongst 
them, one can always be chosen to keep prob$(m) small for every m <II 
simultaneously provided m is an exact power of two and the look-ahead technique 
outlined below is used. 
The desired cryptoracle is constructed by stages; at stage n, we decide on how 
length 2” cleartext messages will be enciphered. Let us say that cryptoracle g n-agrees 
with cryptoracle h if they agree on the encipherement of every message of length less 
than n. We build a sequence fO, f,, f2 ,... of cryptoracles such that, for each n, 
f, 2”.agrees with f, _, . The desired cryptoracle is defined as f = lim,, f,. Intuitively, 
f, is chosen such that, given any integer m < n and any LV OM T, probi(2”‘) is kept 
small for most cryptoracles g that 2”+’ -agree with f,. There is a tradeoff between 
small and most in the above. On the one hand, there must be enough good g’s for 
each particular m and T to make sure there is one, call it f, that is good for every m 
and T simultaneously. On the other hand, prodr(2”‘) must be as small as stated in the 
statement of Theorem 7.1. 
The heart of the construction off lies in a predicate good whose intuitive meaning 
is as follows. Consider any cryptoracle f,- i. Let g be any cryptoracle that 2”-agrees 
with f,_ i. We wish to decide whether it would be wise to define f, as g. For any 
LV OM T and any m < n, we say that g is n-good for f, _, with respect to T and m if 
probR,‘(2”‘) can be kept small for most cryptoracles g’ that 2”“-agree with g. We 
choose f, so that it is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. every LV OM T and every m < n. In 
order to give a more precise definition of “good,” notice that there are two 
possibilities. If m is so small (relative to n and the speed of 7’) that T can only ask 
oracle questions of length less than 2” when run on cryptograms of length 2”. the 
actual choice off,, is irrelevant because Ti’((2”, r, c)) = T$m1((2”‘, r, c)) for any g’ 
that 2”.agrees with f,-, , any sequence of coin tosses p, and any length 2” 
cryptogram (2”, r, c). In this case, the possible f,‘s are either all good or all bad 
depending on whether prod+m1(2”) is already small or not. On the other hand, if T 
can ask long enough oracle questions on length 2” cryptograms, we say that g is 
n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m if there are enough cryptoracles that are (n + l)-good 
for g w.r.t. T and m. Notice that this recursive definition is well founded as long as T 
cannot run forever on any length 2” cryptogram. 
Before we can give the exact definition of “good,” some notation is required. In the 
following, C denotes (0, 1 }, T denotes any LV OM, h denotes any cryptoracle, and n. 
i, j and e denote any integers (i < j). The notations probh,, Sh,, t$ (for a cryptosystem 
302 GILLES BRASSARD 
Q), Kh, E: and c (for a sequence of coin tosses p) were introduced in Sections 3 and 
7. Let f denote the cryptoracle we wish to construct. 
.Z’, denotes Z*“, the set of strings of length 2”. 
Ci denotes Z, x Z,,(a convenient abuse of notation). 
‘P(h) denotes the set of all cryptoracles agreeing with h on the encipherment of 
messages that are not of length n. Formally, a cryptoracle g is in Y”(h) if and only if 
P(S) = z@(s) for every s E Z* - Z”, 
Ef-Ef for every r E C* - .Z”. 
v” denotes #P(h), which is [(2n)!](z”+“. 
YJh) denotes Y*“(h). 
11, denotes v*“. 
~i:~-,(h) denotes {h}. 
YjY(h) denotes the set of cryptoracles agreeing with h on the encipherment of 
messages that are not of length 2’, 2” l,,.., nor 2’: 
yi:j(h)= U [yju,(g)l* gE’f’i:j-l(h) 
Vi:j denotes #YiE,(h), which is ni= i [vk]. 
e, denotes the Giidel number of T under some fixed numbering. 
T, denotes the LV OM whose Godel number is e. 
t,(n) denotes the maximum number of steps p can take on any length n 
cryptogram, no matter which cryptoracle h is used and which sequence of random 
choices is taken. It is possible that tr(n) = co. (This notation corresponds exactly to 
t$(n) where Q is the standard tkc based on any cryptoracle.) 
r+(n) denotes an upper bound on pro6,(2”) that we wish to achieve for every T 
and n. For a technical reason that will be apparent in the proof of Lemma A.3(5), it 
is defined as follows: 
u 
T 
($ = (2t,(2”) + 1) x 2(er+‘)cn++‘) x (n, + I)! 
2*” x n! 9 
where 
n, = [log fT(29J. 
v=(n) denotes, for any given integer m < n, a lower bound on the number of 
different waysf, could be defined at step n if all we cared about were to make sure Tf 
is unlikely to decode a randomly chosen length 2” cryptogram. (See Lemma A.4 for 
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a more precise statement.) For a technical reason that will be apparent in the proof of 
Lemma AS, it is defined as follows: 
[ 
1 
ur(n)=v,x l- 
1 2”+‘X (n+ 1) . 
Notice that 0 < uT(n) < v,. 
DEFINITION. Given any integers m and n such that 0 < m < n, any cryptoracles g 
and h such that g E Y,,(h) and any LV OM T, we say that 
g is n-good for h w.r.t. T and m 
if and only if 
UT(m)> 1 or t,.(2”) < 2” 
2” > tT(2m) and probh,V”) < u,(m) 
2” < t,(2”) and 
#{g’EY,,+,(g)Ig’is(n+l)-goodf0rgw.r.t. Tandm}>u,.(n+I). 
Furthermore, we say that 
g is n-good for h 
if and only if 
g is n-good for h w.r.t. T and m for every LV OM T and every m < n. 
Construction of J 
initialisation: Let f_ , denote the identity cryptoracle. 
stage n > 0: Given f,-, , recursively select any f,, in Y,,df,- ,) such that f, is 
n-good for f, _, . 
stage o: Define f as lirnnmdw f,,. 
(Notice that, at every finite stage, the cryptoracles under consideration differ only 
finitely from the identity cryptoracle. Hence, they can always be finitely described.) 
We still have to show that, at every stage n, there is at least one g, that is n-good 
for f,- , (Lemma AS) and that one of them can be recursively selected (Lemma A. I). 
Moreover, we have to show that the resulting cryptoracle f satisfies the statement of 
Theorem 7.1 (Lemma A.6). 
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LEMMA A.l. Given any integer n and any two cryptoracles g and h such that 
g E Y,,(h), it is recursively decidable whether g is n-good for h. Therefore, as long as 
there is at least one g, E Y”(h) such that g, is n-good for h, one of them can be recur- 
sively selected. 
Proof Simple algebraic manipulations show that ur(m) > 1 whenever 
t,(2”) > 2 (2m-er) It is therefore recursively decidable whether g is n-good for h w.r.t. .
T and m, given any specific LV OM T and integer m ,< n. Indeed, the recursive 
definition of good is well-founded if tT(2m) < 2 (“‘-+) On the other hand, notice that . 
u,(m) > 1 whenever tr(2”) > 2” and e, > 2” - m. Therefore, in order to recursively 
decide whether g is n-good for h, it suffices to verify whether g is n-good for h w.r.t T 
and m for every integer m < n and every LV OM T such that e,. < 2” - m. 1 
LEMMA A.2. Let n be any integer, let p be any sequence of coin tosses and let r 
and c be any strings in Z”. Consider any LV OM T and any cryptoracle h. Let P 
denote 
P = { g E Y”‘(h) I EXTg,((n, r, c)>> = 4. 
Then 
#P<V”X 
2t,(n) + 1 
#C” * 
Proof: It is important to distinguish those questions asked of cryptoracles that 
make use of their key-encoding permutations from those that only involve the 
enciphering permutations. For any s E .?Y*, we say that a LV OM quizzes secret key s 
whenever it asks of its cryptoracle (say g) “here is s, give me P(s)” or, for any 
c’ E C”‘, “here are c’ and s, give me x so that E:,(x) = c’, where r’ = Kg(s).” 
The cryptanalyst who wishes to find x E C” so that E;(x) = c can proceed in essen- 
tially two different directions: either tind s such that Kg(s) = r and use it as the 
legitimate cryptographer would to ask the cryptoracle for x, or find the value of x 
without ever knowing the secret key. In view of this observation, we split P into two 
disjoint subsets as follows: 
Q = ( g E P 1 T”, on (n, r, c) quizzes secret key s, where s is so that P(S) = r), 
R=P-Q. 
We shall prove independently that 
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and 
thus establishing the Lemma. 
Let @ denote the set of permutations of 27’. Consider any fixed indexed family 
E = {E,,lr,w, where each E,, E @ for r’ E 27. Given any k E @, let E denote the 
cryptoracle in Y(h) whose key-encoding permutation is given by k on length n keys 
and whose length n enciphering permutations are given by E. 
Let r denote RC”, let r denote the set of r-sequences of distinct elements of 27, and 
let yi denote the ith entry of y for y E r and 1 < i < 7. The idea behind the proof that 
Q is small is to uniquely encode each permutation k in Q, by a sequence y in r in 
such a way that it is easy to show that only a few y encode a k such that h! is in Q. 
In order to determine the code y E r of a given k E @, run Tt on cryptogram 
(n, r, c). Let D be the set of length n secret keys quizzed in this process. D is that 
subset of the domain of k that really matters when T: is run on (n, r, c). Let d be the 
number of (distinct) keys in D. For each i such that 1 < i < d, let si be the ith distinct 
length n secret key quizzed by Tt on (n, r, c) (in chronological order of oracle 
queries). For each i such that d < i < r let si be the (i - d)th element of 27 - D (in 
any fixed ordering). Finally, y is defined by the equation yi = k(s,) for 1 <i < T. It 
should be obvious that the y so constructed is indeed a r-sequence of distinct elements 
of C”. Moreover, it is not difftcult to see that different permutations in @ are encoded 
differently. Since #@ = #r, we conclude this establishes a one-to-one correspondence 
between @ and K 
Now, consider any k E @ such that E E Q. Let y be the code for k. Say T’ on 
(n, r, c) quizzes d different secret keys. Let s be k-‘(r). By definition of Q and l , Tj 
on (n, r, c} quizzes secret key s. By definition y, yi = k(s) = r for some i such that 
I < i < d. But Tt cannot run for more than t,(n) steps, hence d < t,(n). This shows 
that if y codes a k such that R is in Q, it must be that r appears among the first t,(n) 
entries of y. Therefore, for any fixed family E, 
# ( g E Q 1 the length n enciphering permutations of g agree with E } 
~#{yE~~y,=rforsomeisuchthatl,<i<t,.(n)} 
tr(n) 
= v t,(n) 
,r, 
[#{Y E r 1 yi = r) 1 = t,(n) X (5 - l)! = #@ X =. 
But there are exactly u”/#@ ways of choosing the family E. Therefore 
t,(n) #Q<v”X- 
#C” 
as desired. 
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In order to get an upper bound on #R, a very similar technique is used. Let 9, r 
and 7 be as above. Consider any fixed k E @ and any fixed indexed family 
E = {Er~Jrw~-,r~ 3 where each E,, E @ for r’ E 27’ - {r}. Let s be k-‘(r). Given any 
e E @, let e^ denote the cryptoracle in Y”(h) whose key-encoding permutation is given 
by k on length n keys and whose length n enciphering permutations are given by the 
family E, except for $ which is defined as e. In order to determine the code y E r of 
a given e E @, run Ti on cryptogram (n, r, c). Let D be {x’ E 27’ ) Tf on (n, r, c) asks 
of its oracle “here are x’ and r, give me Ef(x’)“}. D is that subset of the domain of e 
that really matters when Tf is run on (n, r, c) provided secret key s is never quizzed. 
Let d be the number of strings in D. For each i such that 1 < i < d, let xi be the ith 
distinct length n string such that T: on (n, r, c) queries Ef(xi) (in chronological order 
of the oracle queries). If Tf on (n, r, c) provides a length n answer y that is not a 
member of D, let x~+~ be y and, for each i such that d + 1 < i < 7, let xi be the 
(i-d-l)thelementofZ”-(DU{y})( in any fixed ordering); otherwise, for each i 
such that d < i < 7, let xi be the (i - d)th element of C” -D (in any fixed ordering). 
Finally, y is defined by the equation yr = e(xi) for 1 < i < 7. It should be obvious that 
the y so constructed is indeed a member of r. It is no longer true, however, that 
different enciphering permutations are always encoded differently because T,f can ask 
indirect questions about e by quizzing secret key s. Fortunately, it is not difficult to 
see that e cannot share its code with any other member of @ provided Tf never 
quizzes secret key s on input (n, r, c). 
Now, take any e E @ such that e^ E R. Let y be the code for e. By definition of R, 
T,f on (n, r, c) never quizzes secret key s. Therefore y does not code any other e’ E @. 
Let x denote e-‘(c). By definition of G, Et(x) = c. By definition of R, Tf((n, r, c)) = x. 
By definition of 1/, yi = e(Ti((n, r, c))) = c for some i such that 1 < i < t,(n) + 1. 
Exactly as above, this implies that 
which completes the proof of the Lemma. 1 
LEMMA A.3. Let n be any integer. Consider any L V 044 T and any cryptoracle 
h. Assume z+-(n) < 1 (hence ~~(2”) < co) and tT(2”) > 2”. Define n, = [log tT(2n)J and 
n, = n, + 1. Notice that n, > n and 2”O & tT(2”) < 2”‘. For each integer i such that 
n - 1 < i< n, and each gi E Y”:,(h), define 
Let K denote K,- ,(h), the case i = n - 1 above. 
(1) M < (q-(2”) + 1) x #C, x #Z,, x v,:,o. 
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(2) For any i such that n < i < n,, any gj-1 E vY,:i-,(h)Y and any giE yj(gi-l)l 
lygi is not i-good for g,-, w.r.t. T and n, then 
#Ki(gi) > U,(n) X #z,, X #cz X fi l”,j- ‘T(j)l’ j-it, 
(3) As long as there is at least one g, E Y,,(h) that is not n-good for h w.r.t. 7 
and n. 
#K > #1 g, E Y”(h) I g, is not n-good for h w.r.t. T and n) 
x i+(n) X #C,, x #Zi 
(4) #{ g, E Y,,(h) 1 g, is n-good&r 
X j=f)t, lyj - uT<~>l’ 
h w.r.t. T and n) 
>v, l- 
[ 
2,(2”) + 1 
u,(n) x #& ’ jfil [ Vj-ZT(j)]]’ 
(5) #1 g, E Y,,‘,(h) I g, is n-goodfor h w.r.t. T and n} > UT(n). 
Proof: (1) K can be decomposed as follows into a disjoint union: 
U {(r, c, P, g) I (r, c) E pi, P E z,,, , g E y,,(h’) and W”‘3(2”, r, c))) = cl. 
h’e’+’ ncl:n@) 
For any fixed h’ E Yy,+ ,,,O(h), (r, c) E .Zi and p E Z,,, using Lemma A.2, 
#{g E ‘J’Jh’) I Ef(57((2”, r, c))) = c) < v, x 2tT(iz ’ ’ . 
n 
There are v,+~:~~ different ways of choosing h’, #Zi ways of choosing (r, c), and 
#Z,, ways of choosing p. Therefore, 
as desired. 
itcK < (2t,(2”) + 1) x W, x #Z,,, x v,:,,, 
(2) This is proved by downward induction on i. 
basis: For i = n,, take any g,,,-, E Y,,:,,-, (h) and any g,, E Yn,( g,, - J Assume 
g,, is not no-good for g,,,-, w.r.t. T and n. By definition of “good,” since 2”O < tr(2n), 
#i g,, E ul,,(g,,) I g,l is wood for g,, w.r.t. T and n} < dn,) < y,, = #ynl(g,,>. 
Hence, there must exist some gal E Y,,(g,,) such that g,] is not n,-good for g,,@ w.r.t. 
T and n. By the definition of “good” again, since 2”’ > tT(2”), probB,“o(2”) > z+(n). 
But 
Prowl”) = probg;lo@“, 2”‘) = C [#~$92~, P)/#c:,]/#z,,~ 
PSI”, 
571/22/X4 
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because 18.0 on a length 2” cryptogram cannot make more than tr(2”) < 2”’ random 
choices. By definition of K,. and SgTno, 
K,&,,) = Kc G P, s,,> I P E -G, and (G 4 E ~~V9 PII 
= .Ecr’ {(rv G PY &,> I (r, c> E w2n9 PII (disjoint union). 
“I 
Hence 
#K,& g,,) = 1 #Sp0(2~, p) = probg,“o(2”) x #Z,, x #.Zi 
PET., 
> z+(n) x #a?&, x #C:, 
as desired. 
inductive step: For any i such that n < i < n,, take any g,-, E Y”:,_,(h) and any 
gi E Yi( gi_ ,). Notice that gi E Y,,,(h). Assume g, is not i-good for gi_l w.r.t. T and 
n. By definition of “good” and since 2’ < 2”O < tT(2n), 
#{gi+lE yf+*(!Ti)I gi+l is (i + 1)-good for gi w.r.t. T and n} < vT(i + 1). 
Let X denote 
lgi+l E ‘i+l(gi>I gi+l is not (i + 1)-good for gi w.r.t. T and n). 
We have #X > vi+, - vr(i + 1) > 0. Consider any gi+ 1 E X. By the induction 
hypothesis, 
#Ki+,(gi+I) > u,(n) X #zn, X #zi X fi [Vj-UT(J’)l* 
j=i+Z 
But 
Hence, 
Kdgi)= U Ki+ I( gi+ ,) (disjoint union). 
&tl~~l+l(~l) 
#Kit”,) = x #Ki+ l(gi+ I) 2 y #Ki+ *(gi+ I> 
gi+l~~i+l(Bl) gi+lEX 
> [vi+ I - +(i + l)] X UT(n) X #z,, X #Zi 
X j=o+2 [vj-vAAl 
as desired. 
(3) Let X denote {g, E P,,(h) 1 g, is not n-good for h w.r.t. T and n}. Assume X 
is not empty. Consider any g, E X. Using (2), 
#K”(g”) > ‘Ttn) x #‘#I, X #xf, X j=$+, [Vj - VT(j)]* 
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But 
Hence 
K = U K,(g,) (disjoint union). 
#,EY”(h) 
#K = G #K,(g,J > c #K,(g,) 
g,e’+‘,(h) &tEX 
> #X X UT(n) X ?Fz,, X #zi X fj [Vj - UT(j)] 
as desired. 
j=ntl 
(4) If every g, E Y,,(h) is n-good for h w.r.t. T and n, the statement is vacuously 
true. Otherwise, it follows immediately from (1) and (3). 
(5) Follows immediately from (4) and the definitions of u, and ur.. i 
LEMMA A.4. If the Construction reaches stage n for any integer n, then for every 
integer m < n and every L V OM T, 
#Ig,E Ynu,(fn-,)I g, is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m) > v,(n). 
Proof. If UT(m) > 1 or t,(2”) < 2”, the statement is vacuously true since every 
g, E ‘P”(f,- ,) is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m. Otherwise, there are two cases to 
consider. 
If m = n, this is exactly the statement of Lemma A.3(5). 
If m < n (hence n > l), consider what happened at stage n - 1. f,- , was chosen 
among Yfi _ , (f,, _ J such that f,, _, is (n - 1 )-good for f, _ *. Therefore, f, _ 1 is (n - I)- 
good for f, -* w.r.t. T and m. If 2”- ’ < t,(2”), it means that 
#(g, E !P,(f+ ,) 1 g, is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m) > UT(n), 
which is precisely what we want. On the other hand, if 2”-’ > tT(2m), it means that 
prod+-z(2m) < u,(m). But prod;-1(2m) = protiq-‘(2”) because T cannot differentiate 
f,_ , from fne2 on length 2” cryptograms. Since 2” > 2”-’ > tT(2”‘) and 
prod;-V”) < u,(m), every g, E ul,(f,- ,) is n-good for f, w.r.t. T and m. Hence, 
#lgnE ~n(f”-,)lsn is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m} = v, > u,(n). 1 
LEMMA AS. The Construction makes sense: at every stage n, there exists at least 
one cryptoracle in Y,,(f, _ ,) that is n-good for f, _, . 
Proof. Assume the Construction has reached stage n. Let X denote 
1 gn E ~nu,(fn- 1) I g, is n-good for f, _, }. By definition of “good,” 
x= n I&E Y”u,(f,-,)I g” is n-good for f,_, w.r.t. T, and m). 
m<n 
t-<l.J 
Using De Morgan’s Rule, 
x= Pnu,(fn-1) - u l&l E ~n(f,-1) I g, is not n-good for f,- , w.r.t. T, and m). 
m<n 
e<w 
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Hence, 
#*>v,- z #(grtE Ynu,(fn-,)I g, is not n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T, and m). 
m<n e<OJ 
Using Lemma A.4, 
Finally, by definition of ~)~,(n), 
#X>V,- x [ 
V, 
I 
=o. I 
m<n 2’+’ x (n + 1) 
P<O 
LEMMA A.6. The Construction works as intended: for any L V OM T and any 
integer m, pro6,(2”) < UT(m). 
Proof. There are three cases to consider. 
If u,(m) > 1, the result is vacuously true since protii(2m) < 1. 
If tT(2m) < 2m, the result is also vacuously true since pro6,(2”) = 0 because T 
would not have enough time to write down the answer to any length 2” cryptogram, 
even should it know it magically. 
Otherwise, notice that tT(2m) < co. Let n be large enough that 2” > tT(2m). By 
Lemma A.4, 
#(g,E ~“Y,(f,-,))g,isgoodforf,-,w.r.t.Tandm} 
> v,(n) > 0. 
Consider any g, E Y”(f,- ,) that is n-good for f,-, w.r.t. T and m. By definition of 
“good,” prod+-1(2m) < u,(m). But T cannot differentiate f,-, from f on length 2” 
cryptograms. Hence, pro6,(2m) = prodf-1(2m) < u,(m). I 
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.1. 
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